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Afterword
Tom Campbell*
Three articles in this symposium (Donald Kochan, Jonathan
Macey, and Robert Miller) search for a coherent place for
corporate social responsibility (CSR) in today’s jurisprudential
and economic thought space and fail to find it. One article
(Andrew Spalding) claims to have done so.
Professor Kochan’s is the first article skeptical about CSR.
Professor Kochan uses the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) to
demonstrate his position that CSR-oriented plaintiffs, and their
lawyers, can best be understood as “rent-seekers.” It bears
emphasis, however, that Kochan identifies the “rent” being
sought as of a different nature than that in the usual
law-and-economics example. The telltale is that the ATS
plaintiffs’ attorneys appear to seek declaratory judgments,
creating precedent for future announcements of what the “law of
nations” requires; rather than monetary damages for their
clients—when the two are in conflict. One can imagine a private
settlement with non-disclosed terms being perfectly acceptable to
the more traditional rent-seeking litigant, but wholly
unacceptable to the ATS plaintiff, because no “messaging”
(Kochan’s term) would be accomplished by a non-disclosed
settlement.
Kochan’s article thus points toward an interesting area for
future research: How often, prior to Kiobel, did an ATS suit settle
for terms that were not disclosed, as compared with a measure of
any other kind of CSR case? His argument would suggest a
statistically significant difference.
In recognizing this likely difference, Kochan raises one other
point worthy of discussion: In what sense is rent-seeking to
establish international norms of decency by governments
different from rent-seeking to transfer influence over corporate
behavior to employees, members of the community around the
plant, or a broader environmental community? Kochan treats
them all the same. Yet, they are different in an important sense:
* Dean and Donald P. Kennedy Chair in Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, and
Professor of Economics, Chapman University.
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the CSR plaintiff wants to obtain a role in the direction of
on-going corporate behavior. The ATS plaintiff wants to change
governmental behavior, and uses the corporation only as a means
to that end. One might call them both rent-seeking, but in the
sense that one might (in an extreme example) call a religious
missionary curing sick people in a third-world country
rent-seeking because such behavior is pleasing to the missionary
or will earn her or him a place in heaven. Wanting to change the
world is different from wanting to take control of a corporation,
even if the CSR actor believes the latter can lead to the former.
Professor Kochan’s skepticism about the claims of CSR to
moral superiority is found as well in Professors Macey and
Miller’s articles.
In Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law & Economics
Perspective, Professor Macey makes two fundamental points. The
fiduciary duty owed by a corporation to someone diminishes in
value if it is owed to more than one person; and shareholders
value a fiduciary duty owed to them more than any other
claimant because they are residual claimants on what flows from
a corporation’s activities. As a result, corporate social
responsibility should not replace shareholders’ monetary
interests in a corporation’s exercise of its fiduciary duty.
In Coasean Social Responsibility, Professor Miller makes one
fundamental point. All corporate social responsibility claims are
indistinguishable from claims to economic benefit; and, in a
Coasean world with low bargaining costs, the efficient outcome
will be reached. All else, to Miller, is moral posturing.
Let me turn to Macey’s second claim first: that shareholders
value a fiduciary duty more than other claimants do. We can
apply Miller’s thinking to this proposition. In the presence of low
bargaining costs, Macey should not need to posit that
shareholders value fiduciary duties more than others; because, if
others valued them more, they could bargain with shareholders
to purchase them. Hence, Macey is either saying he knows all
such bargaining would lead to shareholders winning the rights
(perhaps at a price), or that bargaining is so expensive, the Coase
Theorem cannot apply; and, as a first approximation, according
the rights to shareholders is more often a correct expression of
how bargaining would result if it were possible.
If the former is what he is saying, then there is no need for
corporate law to award fiduciary rights to shareholders; private
ordering would do so.
If the latter is what Macey is saying, Miller’s analysis
challenges it factually. In each instance of a non-shareholder
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asserted interest, there is a well-defined group presenting claims
against the corporation; and in many instances, there are thirdparty intermediaries who, lacking a claim on the corporation of
sufficient monetary importance to compel the corporation’s
attention, nevertheless serve as monitors for those who do.
Accordingly, Macey’s entire second claim fits within Miller’s
conceptual outline.
However, Miller might be wrong. Let us posit very high
transactions costs. Then, the law must allocate the fiduciary duty
to some group since the groups cannot bid for it among
themselves. The origin of Macey’s claim, that the shareholders
are the right group to possess the benefit of fiduciary duty, stems
from a proposition for which he cites Easterbrook and Fischel:
that the shareholders, as residual claimants, should have the
right to fiduciary duty since they alone have an interest in the
entire performance of the corporation, not simply in some part of
its performance (such as environmental impact, or working
conditions). Environmentalists can specify some level of globalwarming gas emissions; labor rights activists can pressure the
company to follow the modern day equivalent of the Sullivan
principles; but shareholders’ interests are by their nature
incapable of being so clearly defined. Their interest is for the
company to make money; how it does so is not subject to any easy
(and thus contractually enforceable) measurement.
There is some circularity to this argument, which runs:
shareholders are residual claimants; residual claimants should
be the ones to benefit from fiduciary duties; therefore,
shareholders should be owed fiduciary duties.
Suppose, however, that the law made environmentalists
residual claimants. Then, it would follow, that they should have
the benefit of fiduciary duties. Just by speaking of some level of
greenhouse gases as a measurable goal, we have not exhausted
all the interests of the environmentalist claimants any more than
by saying a certain level of earnings per share exhausts all the
interests of the shareholders. Companies strive to do more—for
their residual claimants. If we were to reverse, by law, the
position of environmentalists and shareholders, making the
former the residual claimants, and the latter entitled to some
level of measured earnings, then a fiduciary duty would be owed
to the environmentalists. The way this would be expressed is: a
company should manage the reasonable expectations of its
financial investors for a return, and then do everything in its
power with what is left to improve the environment.
To this I can anticipate the response that I have not really
described shareholders, then, but bond-holders, or preferred
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shareholders, who have some upside cap on their potential
earnings. I would agree. But it is in like manner, by describing
labor and environmental advocates as having narrow, more
easily defined claims, that Macey has by definition excluded
them from being residual claimants. Suppose, by contrast, that
government structures allowed financial interests in a company
to be only of the bond-holder, or preferred stock kind. Suppose,
further, the law gave to environmentalist interests the residual
right that the company must behave in a way that hurts the
environment to the minimal extent possible, consistent with the
other claimants’ rights, including the specified interest or
appreciation of shares owned by those with a financial claim.
Macey’s logic would proceed to the conclusion that the
environmentalists, then, as residual claimants, would have the
right to fiduciary duty.
So, the syllogism that the residual claimant has the benefit
of fiduciary rights tells us nothing about who that residual
claimant should be.
My hypothetical reversal of environmentalists with
shareholders is not completely fanciful. In regulated utilities,
rate-payers hold a position close to my hypothetical.
Shareholders anticipate a reliable dividend but a lower capital
appreciation than shareholders in companies not subject to
public utility regulation. The public utility commission sets
strictures on the company that incidentally limit profit, in
furtherance of a goal of providing dependable water, gas, or
electricity service. Provided the shareholders receive a
reasonable rate of return, the commission might very well say
that the public utility’s managers must spend residual earnings
on improving reliability of service. Who, then, is the residual
claimant on the activities of a public utility?
The conclusion I draw is that Miller provides a helpful
description of how the Coase Theorem makes claims of corporate
social responsibility quite ordinary, expectable, and efficient.
Where transaction costs are so high that the Coase Theorem does
not apply, Macey provides a helpful description of why the
residual claimant should benefit from fiduciary duties. What has
not been proven, however, is who that residual claimant should
be. This is where the normative aspects of this debate enter.
Miller introduces time-honored notions of morality from Kant
and Aquinas, to ask whether a corporation reflecting as much
corporate social responsibility as the claimants urging it are
willing to pay for, is behaving morally. He reaches an agnostic
conclusion. Corporations have no souls; they merely facilitate
collective action by individuals who do. If consumers, employees,
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and environmentalists want X amount of corporate social
responsibility, and convey to the company the Y dollars needed to
bring about X, there is no issue of morality.
Resort to the political world to vindicate corporate social
responsibility goals is briefly alluded to by Macey and Miller. I
believe the treatment of that aspect of corporate social
responsibility should have been more central in the analysis of
each author. Laws can, by themselves, make bargaining costs
extremely high so as to prevent the Coase-like solution Miller
favors.
For example, political groups urge laws to compel
corporations not to pay employees an amount below a certain
minimum wage. Many individuals are willing to work for a lower
wage, but it is forbidden. Some then go without jobs because they
lack the skills necessary to command a wage above the
minimum. Yet, we have enacted minimum wage laws for a long
time—because, it is claimed, they are just. There is nothing
logically different between this historic fact and the same
politicians enacting laws to make employees the residual
claimants on a company’s earnings—because it would be just.
The American labor movement is replete with claims that a job is
owned by the person who works it, and European land reform
with the claim that land is owned by the person who tills it.
What are each of these claims other than an assertion of residual
claimant status?
The answer for both Miller and Macey, and for me, has to be
positive rather than normative. CSR is to be rejected if society
will have less total output, of everything it values, when residual
claimants are other than investors. We might still prefer to
sacrifice some total output, to achieve what many consider a
more just society; but we should do so in an informed way. The
advocates for redistribution of income through steeply
progressing income taxes appear willing to accept less total
output for what they would consider more justice. Occasionally,
some try to argue that a lower Gini coefficient (more evenly
distributed income) induces more economic growth, and, once on
that ground, I am content to allow application of unbiased
statistical research decide the outcome. What is intractable,
however, is that a concept of one person’s (or a majority of voting
persons’) sense of what is fair is worth sacrificing a greater pie
for all. The virtue of articles like Macey’s and Miller’s is to force
to the front the reality that that is, indeed, the fundamental
question of corporate social responsibility. If that explicit
trade-off is not at issue, corporate social responsibility holds no
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different place than an interesting, and occasionally difficult to
measure, element of profit maximization.
Up to this point, the articles I have reviewed present a
universal treatment of CSR as being entitled to no special
intellectual or moral standing. Professor Spalding tries to even
that out.
In The Problem of Deterring Extraterritorial White-Collar
Crime, Professor Spalding suggests a new role for corporate
social responsibility. He suggests appeals to CSR could solve a
failure he sees in neo-classical economic analysis to prescribe
effective deterrence in the case of extraterritorial white-collar
crime statutes.
The problem Spalding takes on is, indeed, interesting and
timely. The United States has, since at least the Lockheed
scandal of the 1970s, been attempting to limit bribery by
companies subject to American jurisdiction in overseas markets.
The 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act represents the statutory
enshrining of that effort. American firms have long complained
that application of such rules to their activities in foreign
markets simply hands contracts to their competitors from other
countries, which do not have an equivalent of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act. American firms lose out and less “ethical”
foreign firms win, while the amount of evil activity in the foreign
(host) country stays the same.
The foregoing dilemma is described by Spalding as “investor
substitution.” The investors (or contractors) from the less ethical
country substitute for the investors from the country trying to
impose a moral code on its own nationals’ behavior. Spalding also
offers the concept of a “discretionary investment forum”—
companies under the jurisdiction of the country attempting to
impose an ethical code can choose simply not to make their
investment or sales activities in the countries where ethical risks
exist. This is the self-selection component of the first
phenomenon Spalding describes, and it leads to the same result.
Whether because companies from countries that do not impose
ethical standards outbid them in the host country, or whether the
risk of incurring legal liability by even entering the host country
is costly, either way, there is less activity by the companies of the
country trying to impose an extraterritorial moral code.
This situation is troublesome. It stems in each case from the
absence of a single governmental regime: one country prohibits
unethical behavior in a host country, and another does not, a
characteristic Spalding calls “selective criminalization.” If all
countries followed the same rules, or, more simply, if the host
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country set a standard of behavior at least as high as the most
demanding foreign country, the problem Spalding identifies
would not occur.
There is a prisoner’s dilemma operating here. The companies
of the country setting the highest standard on its own nationals
will lose out the most, unless a single regime obtains for all
companies. One can expect political resistance, accordingly, to
any effort to adopt an equivalent of the Foreign Sovereign
Corrupt Practices Act in any country that currently lacks a
counterpart of it.
In this, Spalding sees a new role for corporate social
responsibility, which he argues can create international pressure
for uniformity of rules. I do not see this as novel. It is the
standard reply to the prisoner’s dilemma problem. Where each
country would benefit from eliminating bribery by its national
firms that carry on business in foreign countries (Spalding’s
consistent example), but the first country to try to do so will lose
business, all governments have an incentive to reach a treaty to
eliminate bribery, and enforce the ban. Bribery distorts
productive efficiency. The best briber, not the best manufacturer,
wins in the exporting country. And in the host country, bribery
denies consumers the benefits of market rents, directing them
instead to those who have won non-market contests (by getting
into political power).
Analogously, this is why countries apply diplomatic efforts to
arrive at tax treaties, and why they have succeeded in doing so.
At first, it might seem that a country sacrifices revenue by not
taxing all international earnings of a transnational company
with some tie to that country; but if all countries asserted such
authority, international commerce would be depressed. So,
countries work out neutral and transparent rules for allocating
international earnings to be taxed among the several countries
that could claim to tax the transnational company’s operations,
so that companies are not subject to multiple taxation exceeding
100%, or, ideally, the marginal rate of the highest taxing
jurisdiction.
The same is true with most corporate social responsibility
goals; and we can recur to Miller’s article to make the case that
such goals can be fit within a Coasean framework. It is certainly
the case with eliminating bribery.
Other corporate social responsibility goals might fit less
readily, such as the desire to enforce an international minimum
wage. There, the host country would suffer a loss of its
comparative advantage (a cheaper workforce), and so, along with
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other third world countries, might not agree to the universal
rule. Solving the prisoner’s dilemma problem for social goals not
economically beneficial to all countries (even if universally
adopted) might call on an extra-market effort to change perceived
national self-interests. But that is not the example Spalding has
chosen. Economic crime by corporations, bribery in particular, is
his example, and it fits comfortably in the law and economics
modality.
In one part of his article, Spalding attempts to prove too
much. This is his attempt to prove the theoretical possibility that
over-deterrence will actually lead to more law breaking in the
host country. To reach this result, Spalding needs a critical
assumption: that for country A attempting such laws, there is
also a country B, whose companies are willing and able to sell
into the host country, and replace country A’s nationals. If there
is no such country B, then the desire of country A to diminish
bribery by its own nationals in the host country would succeed.
In several highly sophisticated industries, military aircraft, for
instance, there is often no country B to America’s country A, or
one with only limited capacity and reliability. American-made
F-16’s compete with French Mirages in the market to sell fighters
to the third world, but there is no other supplier in a practical
sense; and in the eyes of those more expert than I, the Mirage
might no longer compete. In that situation, the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act could, indeed, have the desired effect of
reducing bribes. If Lockheed Martin, the F-16’s manufacturer,
will not pay bribes, and the Mirage is not considered a close
substitute, there will be fewer bribes with more enforcement of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act than with less. Spalding’s case
could not apply.
Where it could apply, however, Spalding needs a second
critical assumption, which he does not make explicit. Further, I
believe it to be an implausible assumption.
For illustrative purposes, Spalding posits an iterative
process. The world starts with no extraterritorial ethics laws, and
a certain amount of bribery exists in a particular host country. In
the second time period, one exporter’s country develops such
laws, and the amount of bribery drops. In a third time period,
that exporter’s country stiffens its law, and the amount of bribery
increases—though to a level still less than the original level. To
make that interesting result work, Spalding needs to have the
firm subject to the extraterritorial law continue to make bids,
some with bribes, and some without. As it loses market share to
firms from the other exporting country, all of whose companies
pay bribes, the entire amount of bribery in the host country rises.
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A bundle of bids with and without bribes is supplanted by a
bundle of bids entirely with bribes.
However, it is not logical to assume that the companies
subject to the extraterritorial law will make some bids with and
some without bribes. More likely is the outcome that every bid
will always carry a bribe, but that the companies who are
nationals of the country attempting to apply extraterritorial
ethics laws will make fewer bids—hoping not to get caught. It
would be striking if any company would choose to compete with
another company where the other paid bribes and it did not. So,
if that is the case, the stiffening of sanctions for extraterritorial
bribery will shift market share to the companies from a country
without such laws, but the overall number of bribes will stay the
same.2
Spalding does not need to prove this point for his main
conclusion. He need not prove that bribery will go up with more
law enforcement of the extraterritorial kind. He need only prove
it will not go down. To prove the latter, he is on much safer
ground.
However, he still has not proven any claim to CSR’s moral
superiority. The role for corporate social responsibility Spalding
champions has validity wherever collective goods theory would
apply: where a regime is better for all, but harmful to a sole
adapter. Existing law and economics analysis is well able to
handle that case. International efforts to universalize
prohibitions against bribery can lead to an efficient outcome by
solving the prisoner’s dilemma. There is nothing “CSR” about
that conclusion. Like duplicate taxation of earnings, allocating
contracts by personal bribes is economically inefficient.
Suppressing bribery is in the general interest, not because it is
socially responsible, but because it is economically efficient.
The articles in this symposium focus on whether there is any
intellectually coherent content to a claim of corporate social
responsibility. Spalding attempts to claim so, but his case is one
of economic efficiency, not CSR moral superiority. Miller and
Kochan defend the view that CSR has no superior claim to
shareholders’ interests. Macey attempts to go further: to prove
that CSR is always a wrong way to allocate corporate rights, but
his argument contains circularity about the residual claimant
being the shareholder. It thus devolves into a claim that the
shareholder is most often the efficient residual claimholder in the
2 I assume that there is no increasing cost function to making offers for contracts, so
that shifting market share from one kind of bidder to another will not increase the overall
cost of making offers.
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presence of high transactions costs. That may be true, but was
not proven.
To take wealth from others to increase one’s own wealth is
rent-seeking. To do so at the cost of overall efficiency is
rent-seeking and wasteful. To do so because one claims a higher
morality than another is judgmental in the highest degree.
Nevertheless, on occasion, that is what law is called upon to do.
What else is the “law of nations,” to take Kochan’s example, but a
code of behavior that purports to be morally superior to the
behavior of uncivilized peoples? The import of the articles in this
symposium is that we should be quite cautious before granting
such a claim of moral superiority to overcome what a reasonably
free market might otherwise order.

